The sudden and brutal attack on Israel by the Palestinian militant group, Hamas on October 7 took Israel and most of the world by surprise. After all, it had only been 2 years since the arrival of the sophisticated $1.2 B defensive “Iron Wall”, the term used when completed 7 December 2021 by Israeli Defense […]
The sudden and brutal attack on Israel by the Palestinian militant group, Hamas on October 7 took Israel and most of the world by surprise. After all, it had only been 2 years since the arrival of the sophisticated $1.2 B defensive “Iron Wall”, the term used when completed 7 December 2021 by Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz, which completely separates Israel from the Gaza Strip throughout their shared 40-mile border. The Iron Wall extends above and below ground, as well as into the Mediterranean Sea; and with Israel’s consolidated impressive and proven technologies, the wall was designed to deny and impede hostile incursions from the Gaza side of the wall. Embedded within the Iron Wall and observation towers are: sensors to detect underground and above ground encroachment and/or intrusions by those from Gaza as well as automated/remote defense weaponry. The wall itself embeds a laser-based sensor that can detect and report exact location intrusion(s) along its entire span– a technology Future Fibre Technologies (FFT) demonstrated to the author during design of a tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (T-ISR) system to persistently protect highly-critical areas in the US.
Designing an effective T-ISR system for the Israel-Gaza border focused on persistent surveillance, which is tasked to determine if an object (personnel, vehicles, etc.) has entered into a pre-defined restricted area. If such incursions are detected, the T-ISR system performs object identification, target lethality assessment, generates a track timeline (per target with location, direction, & timestamp), processes data to be disseminated to command centers and other sensors (data cross-correlation), and finally generates & broadcasts alerts as required. T-ISR systems are implemented differently based upon system requirements, mission resources, and characteristics associated with the area/volume of interest (AOI/VOI) to be observed and protected. For the Iron Wall, the defense systems were more or less in “plain sight” to Hamas 2 years. Whereas Israeli designers and defenders had to consider all possible means of attack, Hamas need only to concentrate on identifying the wall’s weak links and develop a strategy to leverage using these weaknesses.
We saw this methodology to evaluate “wall” weaknesses by an attacker over time with Michael Creighton’s fictional raptors (Jurassic Park) that constantly tested their electrified fences. This systematic evaluation of defense “weak points” has occurred repeatedly in history: from Genghis Khan’s incursions beyond the great China Wall to the WWII German unexpected and rapid invasion of Belgium by the Wehrmacht by side-stepping the 280-mile Maginot Line France built in the 1930s (a mix of fortresses, underground bunkers, minefields, and gun batteries). Israel too has first-hand experience of unexpected breaches. In 1969, Israel built the Bar Lev line along the entire Suez Canal. Israeli planners estimated it would take a minimum of 24 hours for Egyptian forces to breach this fortified line. To the Israelis’’ surprise, during the early stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War Egypt breached the Bar Lev line in less than two hours.
Referring to the Oct 7th attack, a timeline as to the strategy Hamas employed is forming. The initial assault stage aimed to disrupt surveillance and communications through use of commercial drones that dropped munitions onto communications towers and remote-controlled machine gun turrets. Simultaneously, sniper fire was used against outposts and cameras to negate their effectiveness. As Bergman-Kingsley (New York Times) reported, IDF border soldiers were denied cellular connectivity; and alarm signals were not transmitted, received, or distributed. In coordination with the ground attacks, Hamas provided cover for their ground and airborne terrorists through an intense barrage of rockets (>3000) against Israel in a 20-minute window. Finally, it has been reported that Hamas had knowledge that three IDF battalions at the Gaza border were redeployed to the West Bank on the eve of the Simchat Torah holiday.
As pieces of what occurred on October 7th are revealed, perhaps questions addressing fundamental issues regarding the failure of the Iron Wall will be answered, as: (1) Why didn’t the long-range sensors (>1 miles) or high-resolution cameras pick-up movement sooner, to afford more time for a critical IDF response? (2) How did commercial-size front loaders (“bulldozers”) get to the wall without being detected prior to their breach? (3) Where was the 24/7 overwatch afforded by the IDF ISR-enabled drones that provided persistent overwatch of surveillance areas? (4) How did Hamas successfully jam all critical wall defense command and data communications? (5) Finally, how did Hamas gain so much actionable information on Iron Wall weaknesses to conduct such an overwhelming breach?
There are numerous avenues to designing persistent surveillance systems for tactical action. An approach used is through integration of persistent low-cost, low-power ISR sensors operating autonomously and tiered with sophisticated sensors and fault-tolerant data exfiltration and routing. In considering design and implementation of a T-ISR system, decision-makers at each life-cycle phase must consider at the top level: (1) review/revision of effective and achievable requirements (critical assumptions about opponent and operating characteristics), (2) evaluation of effectiveness & limitations for the applicable sensor and communication technologies, (3) technical and resource limitations, (4) understanding and appropriate application of system performance equations, and (5) implementation of end-to-end system engineering approaches.
These, and several related topics, are presented by ATI’s February 2024 course entitled, Embedding Wireless Sensor Networking (WSN) in Tactical Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (T-ISR). This course is of significant value to those working tactical ISR, WSN systems, Internet of (Battle) Things (IoT, IoBT), ad hoc sensing nets, remote sensing, and solving tactical ISR (T-ISR) mission requirements. To learn more about this course, and to register to attend, you can go here, or to www.aticourses.com for a full listing of other courses.
A drone is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). There is usually a person who has some degree of control over the drone or AUV. Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) refers to the system which includes both the drone and the person who controls it. I often see drones being used for recreational purpose and for smart […]
A drone is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). There is usually a person who has some degree of control over the drone or AUV. Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) refers to the system which includes both the drone and the person who controls it.
I often see drones being used for recreational purpose and for smart business purposes. Although there are a lot of good and beneficial uses for drones today, they are now also being used for more nefarious purposes. Drones have become an integral part of most battlefield scenarios and tacticians are finding new uses for drones every day.
In the early days of drone technology, everyone was thinking about new and novel ways to do good things with drones. Unfortunately, we are now in a time when we must also think about ways to counter some drones that may be trying to do bad things to us, both in the battlefield and in the homeland.
Robin Radar Systems recently reported on technologies which could be considered for defending against drones, referred to as Counter UAS Operations. They discussed a wide range of methods to counter today’s systems with methods that can be implemented today.
Counter UAS Operations involve both monitoring for the presence of drones, and countermeasures to debilitate the drone once detected.
Monitoring for Drones can be done using a variety of methods.
Radio Frequency Analyzers can continuously analyze the RF spectrum and look for signals which are characteristic of drones.
Acoustic Sensors can continuously analyze the audible spectrum and look for noises which are characteristic of drones.
Optical Sensors ( Cameras ) can continuously look at the area and search for objects that look like drones either, automatically, or with the help of an operator.
Radar can also be used to emit energy into the airspace and look for active returns that are characteristic of signals expected from a drone, again either automatically or with the help of an operator.
Once a drone has been detected, the Counter UAS System needs to debilitate that drone. This can be done by destroying the drone, or simply neutralizing the drone so that it can not accomplish its mission. This can be done in a number of ways.
A Radio Frequency Jammer can be employed and used to transmit RF energy toward the drone interrupting communications with the controller, if there is one. Of course, this will be ineffective if the drone is operating autonomously.
A GPS spoofer can be used to send a new GPS signal to the drone, resulting in the drone getting lost and being unable to conduct its mission.
High Power Microwave Devices can be used to generate large Electromagnetic Pulses ( EMP ) which will render most electronic devices, including drones, inoperable.
Nets and Guns can be used to shoot the drone out of the sky or catch the drone and render it inoperable.
A high energy laser can be used to destroy the drone.
Birds of Prey can be trained to hunt and destroy drones.
Robin Radar Systems points out the most effective Counter UAS strategy does not involve a single monitoring method or a single countermeasure method, but a combination of both. By doing so, you take advantage of the benefits of some methods and hedge your bets against the weaknesses of others.
To learn more about Counter UAS operations, consider taking the upcoming ATI course titled Counter UAS Technology and Techniques. This three-day course delivers a thorough overview promoting an understanding and building a successful Counter Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) architecture. You can learn more about the course, and register for it here.
And as always, a full listing of all the courses in the ATI catalogue can be found at www.aticourses.com
Optical Communications Systems may sound very complicated, and they certainly can be very complicated, but they don’t have to be. Think back to when you were a kid and you developed a system with your buddy who lived across the street. You would blink your flashlight in the window two times to indicate that you […]
Optical Communications Systems may sound very complicated, and they certainly can be very complicated, but they don’t have to be.
Think back to when you were a kid and you developed a system with your buddy who lived across the street. You would blink your flashlight in the window two times to indicate that you were still awake, and your buddy might blink his flashlight two times to indicate that he was too. This was an Optical Communication System in its most basic form.
As a Boy Scout, you may have learned to communicate with other scouts using two semaphore flags. You could certainly relay more information than you did using flashlights in the window, but it was still a very basic Optical Communication System with many limitations.
Optical Communications simply refers to relaying information a distance using light to carry the information. It can be performed visually, as in the two previous examples, or by using electronic devices. Clearly, using electronic devices is more complex, and a more powerful way to communicate.
Typically, an optical communication system will include three components. The Transmitter encodes the message into an optical signal. The Channel carries the signal to its destination. And, finally, the receiver which reproduces the original message.
The are two types of channels that can be used in a modern complex optical communication system. Fiber optic cables can relay messages from the transmitter to the receiver, or, the message can be relayed on a laser beam. Clearly, using a laser beam to channel the message is more conducive to long distance transmission, or transmission that needs to occur in free space.
Optical Comms Systems have advantages over RF and Microwave Comms Systems due to their directionality, and high frequency carrier. These properties can lead to greater covertness, freedom from jamming, and potentially much higher data rates.
If you want to learn more, ATI offers Optical Communications Systems. The course provides a strong foundation for selecting, designing and building either a Free Space Optical Comms, or Fiber-Optic Comms System for various applications. Course includes both DoD and Commercial systems, in Space, Atmospheric, Underground, and Underwater Applications. You can learn more about this course, and register for it here.
And, as always, you can learn about the full set of courses offered by ATI at www.aticourses.com
As I looked at the title of the upcoming ATI course called Rockets and Launch Vehicles, the first question I asked myself was “What is the difference between a rocket and a launch vehicle? With the help of google, I learned that all launch vehicles are rockets, but not all rockets are launch vehicles. A […]
As I looked at the title of the upcoming ATI course called Rockets and Launch Vehicles, the first question I asked myself was “What is the difference between a rocket and a launch vehicle? With the help of google, I learned that all launch vehicles are rockets, but not all rockets are launch vehicles. A rocket that is powerful enough to send people, satellites, or spacecrafts into space is called a Launch Vehicle. So, those things you would build and shoot into the sky as a kid are rockets, but they are not launch vehicles.
Rockets, including launch vehicles, take off by burning fuel, which produces a gas byproduct. That escaping gas produces the force that creates the thrust to power the rocket upward.
Most launch vehicles need multiple stages to produce enough thrust get a spacecraft into space. These stages usually sit on top of each other, but there also some designs which have the stages parallel to each other; it all depends on the goals of the mission. The first stage, the stage closest to the ground, is usually the largest. Its purpose is to lift the spacecraft above the earth’s atmosphere to a height of about 150,000 feet. The purpose of the second stage, the stage closest to the spacecraft, is to get the spacecraft to achieve orbital velocity. Usually, when a stage has used up all of its fuel, it serves no additional purpose, so it is jettisoned.
The Space Launch System is a launch vehicle getting a lot of attention and a lot of funding today, The SLS is the Launch Vehicle which will be used for the NASA Artemis missions which will first return to the moon, and then explore beyond. The mission of the first Artemis flight, Artemis I, will be to test the SLS launch vehicle using an uncrewed Orion Spacecraft. This launch will be occurring in March 2022.
If you would like to learn more about rockets and launch vehicles, consider taking the upcoming ATI course Rockets and Launch Vehicles. You can read more about this course, and register for it here.
And, as always, you learn about other upcoming ATI courses at the ATI homepage www.aticourses.com
Just imagine the communication that occurs between a satellite orbiting the earth and the receiving station on earth. Clearly, in order for that communication to be successful, the signal needs to be received at the earth station with enough SNR (signal to noise ratio) for the signal to be intelligently received and acted upon at […]
Just imagine the communication that occurs between a satellite orbiting the earth and the receiving station on earth.
Clearly, in order for that communication to be successful, the signal needs to be received at the earth station with enough SNR (signal to noise ratio) for the signal to be intelligently received and acted upon at the earth station.
In order for the Satellite designers and the Earth Station designers to do their jobs, they must work together to ensure that transmitting satellite transmits with enough power for the receiving station/dish to understand the signal. This would be simple if we could assume that the receiving dish receives all of the power that the satellite transmits, but that would not be a good assumption. There are various things encountered by the signal during its trip between the satellite and the receiving station which each reduce the power of the signal by a small amount. The transmitter must know how much its transmission will be reduced by all of those things, and account for those losses by boosting transmitting power by that amount so that a reduced received power will still be sufficient for the receiving station to get sufficient SNR in the signal.
A Satellite Link Budget is an accounting of all of the gains and looses that signal will experience in space between a transmitter and a receiver.
So, what are the things that may increase or decrease the power of a signal during its journey between a transmitter and a receiver?
Rain is one example of something that reduces the power contained in the signal. A designer must assume that it will always be raining during the transmission, or they will end up with a system which is only effective on non-rainy days. This would not be a good design.
The easiest way to account for gains and losses is with a proven computer tool like SatMaster from Arrowe. Rain models from the ITU (International Telecommunications Union) provide a viable methodology for assessing rain attenuation in microwave and millimeter wave bands.
And, what are some of the other things that will reduce transmitted power? These are all great questions, beyond the scope of this blog.
If you design transmitters, or if you design receivers, or if you simply want to learn more about Satellite Link Budgets, consider taking the upcoming ATI course Satellite Link Budget Training on the Personal Computer – GEO and non-GEO, L through Q/V bands. You can learn more about this course and register to attend the course here.
Todd Johnson did a good job of explaining the use of composites in his article “Composites in Aerospace.” (ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/composites-in-aerospace-820418.) Rather than reinvent the wheel, lets just review some of what he reported in his article. When it comes to designing aircraft, maximizing the “lift to weight ratio” is very important. So, […]
Todd Johnson did a good job of explaining the use of composites in his article “Composites in Aerospace.” (ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/composites-in-aerospace-820418.) Rather than reinvent the wheel, lets just review some of what he reported in his article.
When it comes to designing aircraft, maximizing the “lift to weight ratio” is very important. So, engineers continuously strive to increase lift, or decrease weight, or both. This article discusses how one might decrease the weight of an aircraft.
The earliest aircraft contained a metal structure and many metal parts. This should not be surprising because metal was the strongest material known to engineers at that time. Composites, however, are a material which can often be used instead of metal. One of the many advantages of composites is that they are much lighter than metal. Since the late 1980s, the use of composites in aerospace has doubled every five years, so it is definitely a thriving technology. As if weight reduction would not be reason enough, there are even more advantages to using composites in aerospace engineering.
In addition to dramatically reducing the weight of the aircraft, use of composite materials in aerospace engineering has the following additional advantages:
Easier to assemble complex components
Higher strength at a reduced weight
Mechanical properties can be tailored to specific requirements
More thermally stable so expansion and contraction not an issue
High Impact resistance and damage tolerance
Elimination of electrical corrosion problems
Whether it’s commercial airline industries trying to reduce operating costs, or the military trying to increase payload, range, and survivability of their weapons, composites are the key to accomplishing the goal.
If you want to learn more about the subject, consider enrolling in the ATI course Composite Materials for Aerospace. This three-day course is designed for mechanical or materials engineers and managers that are going to use composite materials, i.e., graphite/epoxy, etc., in aerospace and military applications. To learn more about this course, and to register to attend, you can go here.
As always, a full listing of ATI courses and a schedule of upcoming courses can be found at https://aticourses.com
As discussed in a recent ATI Blog, Model Based Systems Engineering is a great way to accomplish goals cheaper, faster, and better. MBSE alleviates the need to verify your design and construction with frequent and expensive field testing. Unfortunately, however, there is still a need to occasionally conduct field testing. Field testing may be required […]
As discussed in a recent ATI Blog, Model Based Systems Engineering is a great way to accomplish goals cheaper, faster, and better. MBSE alleviates the need to verify your design and construction with frequent and expensive field testing. Unfortunately, however, there is still a need to occasionally conduct field testing. Field testing may be required to verify the validity of models which feed your MBSE. Additionally, it is sometimes critically important to conduct field tests, even though Models suggest that the system will work as designed. One example of this would be when human lives are at stake, and the designer is unwilling to put full trust in the MBSE.
The design of the US’s newest Aircraft Carrier, The Gerald Ford Class Carrier, is an excellent example of how Field Testing may be used in conjunction with MBSE.
The US Navy explains that “The Navy designed the Ford-class carrier using advanced computer modeling methods, testing, and analysis to ensure the ships are hardened to withstand harsh battle conditions.” Although MBSE assured engineers that the ship would be safe in battle conditions, field testing was ordered in order to verify the MBSE. Such verification is not performed for every design. In fact, the last time field testing was used by the Navy to verify MBSE was in 2016 for Littoral Combat Ships.
Pyrotechnic Shock Testing on August 8, 2021 in water off the coast of Florida validated the ship’s ability to sustain operations in a simulated combat environment. Forty Thousand pound (40,000 lb) underwater explosions were released at distances progressively closer to the Carrier, which was heavily instrumented to record the amount of shock that was experienced onboard.
The Navy explains that “These shock trials have tested the resiliency of Ford and her crew and provided extensive data used in the process of validating the shock hardness of the ship.”
Engineers should always use MBSE, but must also be familiar with Pyrotechnic Shock Testing which is sometimes required in addition to MBSE.
To read the US Navy’s reporting of this Pyrotechnic Shock Testing, and to see pictures and videos of the testing, you can go here.
To read about and register for ATI’s upcoming Pyrotechnic Shock Testing course, you can go here.
And, as always, to see a full listing of all ATI courses, you can go here.
For decades, the state of the art in missile technology has been Ballistic Missiles. A Ballistic missile follows a ballistic trajectory to deliver its warhead, or warheads, onto a predetermined target. The missile is put into orbit by a rocket, and the remainder of its flight is unpowered. The missile simply falls like a rock […]
For decades, the state of the art in missile technology has been Ballistic Missiles. A Ballistic missile follows a ballistic trajectory to deliver its warhead, or warheads, onto a predetermined target. The missile is put into orbit by a rocket, and the remainder of its flight is unpowered. The missile simply falls like a rock on a highly predictable approach. Due to the nature of its flight, Ballistic Missiles can easily be countered by Anti-Ballistic Missiles. The ABM can intercept and destroy the Ballistic Missile at any point during its flight. Many countries have mastered the technology of Ballistic Missiles, and Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense. It is what drove the Cold War.
In recent years, however, we have been introduced to a new missile technology. Hypersonic Missiles have changed the art of war as we know it. Hypersonic missiles travel at least five times the speed of sound, and they can fly much lower to the ground than conventional Ballistic Missiles. These hypersonic missiles are more of a threat because they are highly maneuverable. Due to their speed and their maneuverability, they are difficult, if not impossible, to detect by traditional anti-ballistic missile defense systems. And, due to their immense kinetic energy, they are even more destructive to the target that they are directed toward. Hypersonic missiles are a game changer.
Russia, China, North Korea, and the US have all tested hypersonic missiles. When they become operational and get incorporated into military arsenals, it will be truly significant for both aggressors and target countries.
This is truly the way of the future in Rocket and Missile technology. Scientists and engineers need to be familiar with this new type of missile.
If you would like to learn more about Rocket and Missile Fundamentals including the Hypersonic Missile technology, consider enrolling in ATI’s upcoming course Rocket and Missile Fundamentals. The instructor has recently added a unit discussing Hypersonic Missiles.
As always, a complete listing of ATI’s courses can be found here.
How many of us actually think about automation and safety when we drive our cars? Rest assured, the Department of Transportation has a well thought-out plan which has been documented in a series of reports. In 2017, DOT issued Automated Driving Systems, A Vision for Safety 2.0. In 2018, the DOT expanded the scope of […]
The concepts described in this series of reports date back to second half of the twentieth century (1950 -2000) when engineers concentrated on the most rudimentary safety and convenience features such as seat belts, cruise control, and anti-lock brakes. During the next 10 years ( 2000 – 2010 ), engineers worked on advanced safety features like blind spot detection, and warnings for lane departure and forward collisions. These advances simply alerted the driver to a potential safety issue, but still did nothing to remedy the situation. From 2010 to 2016, engineers came up with driver assistance features like automatic emergency braking and lane centering assist. These features were the start of the path toward fully automated vehicles. From 2016 to 2025, we will become acquainted with partially automated safety features like adaptive cruise control and self-park. All of this should lead us to a fully automated vehicle capable of driving on highways using autopilot in the years following 2025. It has been a relatively short span of time, and there have been many advances in automated vehicle technology.
As automobile drivers, we are not really sure how these automated systems work. We simply know that they work, and we are glad that they are there to help us out. Behind the scenes, however, engineers and scientist are thinking about the requirements and designs and continuously developing ways to advance the state of the art.
While radars were once only associated with complex military systems, they are becoming more common today in cars that require them for many of the automated features that have been developed over the years. Simple radar technology is behind many of the collision avoidance features in today’s cars, and it was instrumental in turning simple cruise control into adaptive cruise control. In order for automated features in cars to advance, however, so to must the state of the art in radar. One such advance in radar technology is its ability to not only detect a target, but to track it too. And then, another advance is its ability to track multiple targets at the same time. Advances in this technology will truly advance our ability to move closer to the goal a fully automated vehicle.
To learn more about advances in multi target tracking, consider enrolling in the upcoming offering of ATI’s Multi Target Tracking and Multi Sensor Data Fusion. Also, take a look at the schedule of upcoming ATI courses here.
An ATI Staff Member who has not taken any ATI Radar Courses yet found a story in her Inbox about a highway officer in Texas who was operating a hand-held radar to catch speeders. As you can read in the following copy of the letter, the officer purportedly locked onto a USMC F/A-18 Hornet Jet. […]
An ATI Staff Member who has not taken any ATI Radar Courses yet found a story in her Inbox about a highway officer in Texas who was operating a hand-held radar to catch speeders. As you can read in the following copy of the letter, the officer purportedly locked onto a USMC F/A-18 Hornet Jet. The story purports that the Jet detected energy from the hand held radar, and automatic tactical systems on the Jet nearly fired on the radar/officer, but the pilot overrode those automatic systems preventing a catastrophic mishap.
Although this story is humorous, it also demonstrates that the writer, and some readers, are not familiar with how hand-held radars work, and how the Tactical Systems on the USMC Jet work. In fact, a Snopes article gives an excellent explanation of why this story, although humorous and entertaining, is not factual, and could not have actually occurred. A fascinating explanation of the fallacies associated with this story can be found at https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/police-radar-missile/
So, in order to better recognize articles like this for what they are, please consider learning more about Radar Systems. ATI offers 78 courses dealing with Radar, Missiles, and Defense, but our most popular Radar courses are Radar 101, Radar 201, and Radar Principles. More information on all of these courses can be found on the ATI web page at the following links.
A recent article on the Military.com web site shares the story of the latest attack by a swarm of drones and guided missiles on Saudi Oil Plants. Saudi Arabia currently has at least six Patriot batteries, which cost about $1 billion apiece, according to Bloomberg News. But analysts said the systems are designed to defend […]
A recent article on the Military.com
web site shares the story of the latest attack by a swarm of drones and guided
missiles on Saudi Oil Plants. Saudi Arabia currently has at least six Patriot
batteries, which cost about $1 billion apiece, according to Bloomberg News. But
analysts said the systems are designed to defend against high-flying ballistic
missiles and were vulnerable to swarms of low-and-slow drones and subsonic,
ground-hugging cruise missiles. This article highlights the ever changing
military world, and the need for ongoing education and training on emerging technology.
From the State Department in 2015 “As other nations begin to employ military UAS more regularly and as
the nascent commercial UAS market emerges, the United States has a
responsibility to ensure that sales, transfers, and subsequent use of all
US-origin UAS are responsible and consistent with US national security and
foreign policy interests, including economic security, as well as with US
values and international standards.” This issue was discussed in an ATI
Blog from 2015. While the UAS market is no longer the new kid on the block,
it is ever changing now more than ever. We need to continue effective training
and education for ongoing support and future development as well as that of
guided missiles as they are now being used in tandem. As we move forward into
2020 the need for continuing training and education on UAS, engineering and
missile design and deployment is clearly a worldwide hot spot and needed now
more so then ever. Whether the UAS is for conventional or shadow wars, ATI
Courses has an education offering to help you navigate these ever emerging technologies.
Speaking for myself, I always considered the nuclear triad to include bombers, submarines, and missiles, but, I was wrong. Sandra Erwin points out in her Space News article, we really need to remember that these three components of the triad could not be effective without two other complimentary components, a competent work force to operate […]
Speaking for myself, I always considered the nuclear triad to include bombers, submarines, and missiles, but, I was wrong. Sandra Erwin points out in her Space News article, we really need to remember that these three components of the triad could not be effective without two other complimentary components, a competent work force to operate them, and a modern and reliable Nuclear Command, Control and Communications ( NC3 ) network.
Lt. Gen Jack Weinstein, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration recently pointed out that nuclear modernization efforts cannot be strictly focused on subs, bombers, and missiles, but must also be concerned about modernizing the NC3 system, causing him to remark “The Triad also means space capability.” The Nuclear Posture Review reported that many of the components of the current NC3 system are antiquated technology which has not been modernized in almost 30 years.
Sandra Erwin reports that the Air Force does have programs under way to modernize communications and early-warning satellites, but integration of these new systems will be very complex, and highly trained work force will be needed to build the systems.
Interestingly, Lt. Gen Weinstein has confidence in the military’s ability to train their people to operate these systems, but he expresses concern about educating the civilian workforce which will also need to be involved.
Applied Technology Institute (ATI) can play an important role in preparing the workforce which will support the future nuclear Triad since it offers a diverse collection of courses which cover all of the domains where the Triad will need to operate; air, sea, and space. Please consider looking at the current set of course offerings at ATI and consider taking some of our courses to better position yourself to make significant contributions to solving the complex problems associated with Strategic Deterrence in the future.
The weapons and technologies of war are constantly evolving – changing more rapidly year to year in the 21st Century. Bob Schena, CEO of Rajant Corp. in Malvern, PA, notes, “Spectrum dominance is the new high ground; all weapons systems today are highly reliant on communications of one sort or another, whether global positioning system […]
The weapons and technologies of war are constantly evolving – changing more rapidly year to year in the 21st Century.
Bob Schena, CEO of Rajant Corp. in Malvern, PA, notes, “Spectrum dominance is the new high ground; all weapons systems today are highly reliant on communications of one sort or another, whether global positioning system (GPS) or internal communications. If someone can distort GPS or disable onboard systems, you’re toast. On a scale of 1 to 10, it’s a 12. We are so reliant on communications in our style of fighting that it is absolutely critical and will get even more critical. If you’re at a communications disadvantage, I don’t see how you can last very long.”
As the lines tend to blur between EW, cyber warfare, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) tending to blur, EW itself is changing as well.
U.S. Army, says Maj. Rich-ard Michel, Cyber & EW Operations Troop Commander within the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) at Fort Meade, MD, notes, “As a result of our better understanding of multi-domain battle and our use of EW, cyber, and space ops as they continue to evolve, we will continue to experience a more advanced and capable Army than has ever been seen in history. AWG’s job is to look at the decision-making process, how that will change doctrine and organizations. New technologies give commanders better options on how to employ that capability. That is an inevitability and an absolute positive for the Army, with greater capabilities and technologies empowering us to accomplish our goals.”
Experts note that they will witness even greater speed and evolutionary technologies in the next decade and beyond that few can even partially predict. One that is on everyone’s list, however, is artificial intelligence (AI), which is likely to play a major role in the future of EW as advances in technology are occurring at a record pace.
Marc Couture, senior product manager for digital signal processing at the Curtiss-Wright Corp. Defense Solutions Division in Ashburn, VA, notes, “In EW, you need to convert everything to ones and zeros with analog-to-digital converters. In terms of capturing the EM spectrum in an RF microwave sense, we have some products that capture data at 25 gigasamples per second, which is a huge amount and fairly unique,” Couture says; 1 gigasample is one billion samples. “What’s been very instrumental with the A/D converters is the speed of gigasamples per second is getting faster and faster and with greater resolution. With an EW system, then, you can keep an eye on more of the spectrum at the same time, Ten years ago, technology would not have been able to pick out all the signals deep in the noise. But this also means the data becomes a bigger fire hose, so you will need multiple high-power processing to sort it all out.”
While evolving technologies advance at a record pace, artificial intelligence is likely to play a major role in EW. Couture also notes that, “In the past in EW, you had a classified list of target signatures, but now there are more and more new threats and to counter some of them – especially if you are in theater in combat and seeing something for the first time – you have cognitive systems, a neural net AI, sometimes called deep learning or machine learning, to do this on the fly,” Couture says. “It’s in the toddler phase now, but these cognitive techniques will begin deploying in the next decade. This will require a lot more processing power than a decade ago. It used to be megaflops, now gigaflops, and becoming teraflops.”
For more on this topic: http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/print/volume-28/issue-8/special-report/electronic-warfare-evolves-to-meet-new-threats.html?cmpid=enl_mae_wrap_up_2017-10-20&email_address=francescoz@aticourses.com&eid=295596886&bid=1901119
The Applied Technology Institute (ATI) offers a wide variety of up-to-date and in-depth courses in Radars, Missiles, and Defense.
As Hurricane Irma churned through the Caribbean and up Florida’s coast, satellites have been capturing high-resolution images of the storm’s damage. Imaging in the Caribbean became possible over the weekend as the clouds moved out of the area. Before-and-after imagery taken between Friday, Sept. 8 and Sept. 11 of several places in the Caribbean: Tortola, […]
As Hurricane Irma churned through the Caribbean and up Florida’s coast, satellites have been capturing high-resolution images of the storm’s damage. Imaging in the Caribbean became possible over the weekend as the clouds moved out of the area.
Before-and-after imagery taken between Friday, Sept. 8 and Sept. 11 of several places in the Caribbean: Tortola, Turks and Caicos, St Maarten, Necker Island, Barbuda and Saint Martin. The “after” images were taken by Digital Globe’s WorldView-3, WorldView-2 and GeoEye-1 satellites.
Digital Globe has also publicly released pre- and post-event satellite imagery of the areas affected by Hurricane Irma through our Open Data Program, which provides imagery to support recovery efforts in the wake of large-scale natural disasters. Humanitarian Open Street Map Team (HOT) set up mapping tasks for Irma using Digital Globe imagery in preparation for the storm. Additional tasks will be established once more post-event imagery is available, as will a Tomnod crowd sourcing campaign.
Photos credit to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/Department of Commerce.
A Twitter account tied to a group that the Defense Intelligence Agency recently described as “Russian hackers … supporting Russia’s military operations” returned to the spotlight Wednesday by posting a message that alleges Ukrainian government officials and businessmen laundered money and sent it to Hillary Clinton by making donations to the Clinton Foundation. These allegations, a vague […]
A Twitter account tied to a group that the Defense Intelligence Agency recently described as “Russian hackers … supporting Russia’s military operations” returned to the spotlight Wednesday by posting a message that alleges Ukrainian government officials and businessmen laundered money and sent it to Hillary Clinton by making donations to the Clinton Foundation.
These allegations, a vague and loosely defined set of financial connections described in a single graphic and related blog post, could not be confirmed. The blog post alludes to an inappropriate relationship between Ukrainian billionaire Victor Pinchuk and the Clinton family. But emails that were supposedly stolen and posted in this blog post do not prove that such a conspiracy occurred. An attempt to contact the group went unanswered.
The Tweet posted Wednesday by this “CyberBerkut” group is the first such message posted publicly since January after the account shared an image of a redacted email it claims revealed plans by the U.S. government to doctor evidence to suggest that Russian hackers had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.
Read More Here.
A Twitter account tied to a group that the Defense Intelligence Agency recently described as “Russian hackers … supporting Russia’s military operations” returned to the spotlight Wednesday by posting a message that alleges Ukrainian government officials and businessmen laundered money and sent it to Hillary Clinton by making donations to the Clinton Foundation. These allegations, a […]
A Twitter account tied to a group that the Defense Intelligence Agency recently described as “Russian hackers … supporting Russia’s military operations” returned to the spotlight Wednesday by posting a message that alleges Ukrainian government officials and businessmen laundered money and sent it to Hillary Clinton by making donations to the Clinton Foundation.
These allegations, a vague and loosely defined set of financial connections described in a single graphic and related blog post, could not be confirmed. The blog post alludes to an inappropriate relationship between Ukrainian billionaire Victor Pinchuk and the Clinton family. But emails that were supposedly stolen and posted in this blog post do not prove that such a conspiracy occurred. An attempt to contact the group went unanswered.
The Tweet posted Wednesday by this “CyberBerkut” group is the first such message posted publicly since January after the account shared an image of a redacted email it claims revealed plans by the U.S. government to doctor evidence to suggest that Russian hackers had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.
Summary of Congressional Research Service Report https://news.usni.org/2017/06/01/report-congress-virginia-class-attack-submarine-program The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines since FY1998. The two Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2017 are to be the 25th and 26 th boats in the class. The 10 Virginia-class boats programmed for procurement in FY2014- FY2018 (two per year for five […]
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines since FY1998. The two Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2017 are to be the 25th and 26 th boats in the class. The 10 Virginia-class boats programmed for procurement in FY2014- FY2018 (two per year for five years) are being procured under a multiyear-procurement (MYP) contract.
From FY2025 to FY2036, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a dip or valley, reaching a minimum of 41 boats (i.e., 25 boats, or about 38%, less than the 66-boat force-level goal) in FY2029. This projected valley is a consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley in SSN force levels could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries.
The Navy has been exploring options for mitigating the projected valley. Procuring additional Virginia-class boats in the near term is one of those options. In that connection, the Navy has expressed interest in procuring an additional Virginia-class boat in FY2021. Congress also has the option of funding the procurement of one or more additional Virginia-class boats in FY2018-FY2020.
Lockheed Martin will manufacture additional AN/TPQ-53 counterfire radar systems for the U.S. Army under a $1.6 billion order-dependent contract. The Q-53 radar system supports troops in combat by detecting, classifying, tracking and identifying the location of enemy indirect fire in either 360- or 90-degree modes. Lockheed Martin completed the 100th Q-53 radar system for the […]
Lockheed Martin will manufacture additional AN/TPQ-53 counterfire radar systems for the U.S. Army under a $1.6 billion order-dependent contract. The Q-53 radar system supports troops in combat by detecting, classifying, tracking and identifying the location of enemy indirect fire in either 360- or 90-degree modes.
Lockheed Martin completed the 100th Q-53 radar system for the Army in January and is manufacturing multiple Q-53 radar systems per month. Since Lockheed Martin won the development contract for the Q-53 radar in 2007, the company has won five additional contracts for a total of more than 100 radar systems, 95 systems have been delivered to the Army. With this full-rate production contract award, the Army’s complement of Q-53 radar systems will total more than 170.
“The Q-53 system helps troops know what is going on around them in an increasingly complicated world,” said Rick Herodes, director of Lockheed Martin’s Q-53 radar program. “What’s so special about the Q-53 radar system is the inherent flexibility of its software controlled active electronically scanned array (AESA). Our engineers can adjust the Q-53’s software to address emerging threats. Having control in the software allows quick reaction to whatever comes next – so the first Q-53 radar system off the line could be quickly updated to be just as capable as the 170th Q-53 radar system.”
Lockheed Martin is the only company producing active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars for the Army.
Over the last 10 years new threats have emerged including unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Thanks to the flexibility of open architecture designs, simple software modifications can be made to adjust radar systems, including the Q-53 radar, to meet various missions. The U.S. Army awarded Lockheed Martin a $28 million contract in November for “quick reaction capability to add counter-unmanned aerial system to the AN/TPQ-53 radar system” simultaneous with its core counterfire mission.
The Q-53 radar can be readily adapted to provide both air surveillance and counterfire target acquisition in one tactical sensor. The radar system demonstrated its multimission radar (MMR) capability by identifying and tracking aerial systems and passing that information to a command and control node, a key capability as the battlespace rapidly becomes more crowded with emerging air threats.
The Q-53 supports counter-insurgency missions as well as high-intensity combat operations. The system is highly mobile on the battlefield; it can be set up in five minutes, taken down in two minutes and supports two-man operation.
Work on the Q-53 radars is performed at Lockheed Martin facilities in Syracuse and Owego, New York, Moorestown, New Jersey, and Clearwater, Florida.
For additional information, visit our website: www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/tpq53.html
Contents Introduction 5 Iran’s Policy Motivators 5 Threat Perception 5 Ideology 6 National Interests 6 Factional Interests and Competition 7 Instruments of Iran’s National Security Strategy 8 Financial and Military Support to Allied Regimes and Groups 8 Other Political Action 11 Diplomacy 11 Iran’s Nuclear and Defense Programs 12 Nuclear Program 12 […]
Contents
Introduction 5
Iran’s Policy Motivators 5
Threat Perception 5
Ideology 6
National Interests 6
Factional Interests and Competition 7
Instruments of Iran’s National Security Strategy 8
Financial and Military Support to Allied Regimes and Groups 8
Other Political Action 11
Diplomacy 11
Iran’s Nuclear and Defense Programs 12
Nuclear Program 12
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities 12
International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program 14
Developments during the Obama Administration 15
Missile Programs and Chemical and Biological Weapons Capability 17
Chemical and Biological Weapons 17
Missiles 18
Conventional and “Asymmetric Warfare” Capability 21
Military-Military Relationships and Potential New Arms Buys 21
Asymmetric Warfare Capacity 22
Iran’s Regional and International Activities 25
Near East Region 25
The Persian Gulf 25
Iranian Policy on Iraq, Syria, and the Islamic State 36
Iraq 36
Syria 38
Iran’s Policy toward Israel: Supporting Hamas and Hezbollah 39
Hamas 40
Hezbollah 41
Yemen42
Turkey 43
Egypt 44
South and Central Asia 44
The South Caucasus: Azerbaijan and Armenia 44
Central Asia 45
Turkmenistan 46
Tajikistan 46
Kazakhstan 47
Uzbekistan 47
South Asia 48
Afghanistan 48
Pakistan 49
India 50
Sri Lanka 51
Russia 51
Europe 52
East Asia 53
China 53
Japan and South Korea 54
North Korea 54
Latin America 55
Venezuela 56
Argentina 56
Africa 57
Sudan 58
Prospects and Alternative Scenarios 59
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Near East …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 25
Figure 2. Major Persian Gulf Military Facilities ………………………………………………………………… 34
Figure 3. South and Central Asia Region ………………………………………………………………………….. 44
Figure 4. Latin America ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 55
Figure 5. Sudan ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 57
Tables
Table 1. Major Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism Attacks or Plots ……………………………………………. 10
Table 2. Iran’s Missile Arsenal ………………………………………………………………………………………… 20
Table 3. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal …………………………………………………………………… 23
Table 4. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) …………………………………………………… 24
Table 5. Military Assets of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States …………………………….. 35
Contacts
Author Contact Information ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 61
Iran’s national security policy is the product of many, and sometimes competing, factors: the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution; Iranian leadership’s perception of threats to the regime and to the country; long-standing Iranian national interests; and the interaction of the Iranian regime’s various factions and constituencies. Some experts assert that the goal of Iran’s national security strategy is to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United States and its allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Iran characterizes its support for Shiite and other Islamist movements as support for the “oppressed” and asserts that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. Others interpret Iran as primarily attempting to protect itself from U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate it or to change its regime. Its strategy might, alternatively or additionally, represent an attempt to enhance Iran’s international prestige or restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of the ancient Persian empires. From 2010 until 2016, Iran’s foreign policy also focused on attempting to mitigate the effects of international sanctions on Iran.
Iran employs a number of different tools in pursuing its national security policy. Some Iranian policy tools are common to most countries: traditional diplomacy and the public promotion of Iran’s values and interests. Iran also has financially supported regional politicians and leaders. Of most concern to U.S. policymakers is that Iran provides direct material support to armed groups, some of which use terrorism to intimidate or retaliate against Israel or other regional opponents of Iran. Iran’s armed support to Shiite-dominated allied governments, such as those of Syria and Iraq, also has fueled Sunni popular resentment.
Iran’s national security policy focuses most intently on the Near East region, including on U.S. operations, allies, and activities in that region. It is that region where all the various components of Iran’s foreign policy interact. Iran’s policy also seems to be directed at influencing the policies and actions of big powers, such as those in Europe as well as Russia, that are active in the Near East—either as partners or antagonists of U.S. interests in that region.
Some experts forecast that Iran’s foreign and defense policies would shift after international sanctions were eased in January 2016 in accordance with the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Additional financial resources enable Iran to expand its regional influence further. Others assessed that the nuclear agreement would cause Iran to moderate its regional behavior in order not to jeopardize the agreement and its benefits. During 2016, Obama Administration officials and U.S. reports asserted that there was little, if any, alteration of Iran’s national security policies. On February 1, 2017, the Trump Administration cited Iran’s continued “malign activities” and repeated ballistic missile tests, and asserted that Iran “is now feeling emboldened” and that the Administration was “officially putting Iran on notice.” The Administration subsequently sanctioned additional Iran missile entities under existing authorities and maintained that a “deliberative process” was underway that could result in further actions not contravening the JCPOA. Recent U.S. statements and press reports indicate the Administration might be considering military efforts to set back Iranian influence in Yemen, and perhaps elsewhere.
Iran has used the JCPOA to ease its international diplomatic isolation and to try to develop itself as a regional energy and trade hub and to explore new weapons buys. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s core goals, but support Iran’s reintegrate into regional and international diplomacy.
View full report here.
Applied Technology Institute (ATI Courses) offers a variety of courses on Radar, Missiles & Defense. The news below would be of interest to our readers. The U.S. Navy successfully conducted a flight test March 15 with the AN/SPY-6(V) Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) off the west coast of Hawaii, Naval Sea Systems Command announced in […]
An Arleigh Burke class destroyer
Applied Technology Institute (ATI Courses) offers a variety of courses on Radar, Missiles & Defense. The news below would be of interest to our readers.
The U.S. Navy successfully conducted a flight test March 15 with the AN/SPY-6(V) Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) off the west coast of Hawaii, Naval Sea Systems Command announced in a March 30 release.
During a flight test designated Vigilant Hunter, the AN/SPY-6(V) AMDR searched for, detected and maintained track on a short-range ballistic missile target launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai. This is the first in a series of ballistic missile defense flight tests planned for the AN/SPY-6(V) AMDR.
Read more here.
Free Troubleshooting EMI workshop. Identify, Characterize, and Prevent Electromagnetic Interference Problems Hosted by Rohde & Schwarz Join this highly focused free one-day seminar and learn how to uncover, characterize, and solve the most elusive EMI problems. Troubleshooting and localizing intermittent signals or multiple layers of broadband and narrowband signals can be frustrating even for the […]
Free Troubleshooting EMI workshop.Identify, Characterize, and Prevent Electromagnetic Interference Problems
Hosted by Rohde & Schwarz
Join this highly focused free one-day seminar and learn how to uncover, characterize, and solve the most elusive EMI problems. Troubleshooting and localizing intermittent signals or multiple layers of broadband and narrowband signals can be frustrating even for the most seasoned EMC troubleshooter and RF engineer. We will discuss and demonstrate a number of test setups that can help the root causes of EMC test failures and then demonstrate how real-time analysis can literally make previously-hidden signals leap into plain view.
This seminar is intended for engineers and technicians involved in the development, troubleshooting, pre-compliance testing and certification of electronic products, systems and assemblies for EMC.
More information here.Instructor:
Lee Hill is an industry expert in electromagnetic compatibility and founding partner of SILENT Solutions LLC, an EMC and RF design firm established in 1992. Lee provides EMC troubleshooting services, design reviews, and training to a wide variety of industries nationally and around the world. He earned his MSEE in electromagnetics from the Missouri University of Science and Technology EMC Laboratory.
Contact this instructor
ATI is proud that several of our instructors and friends are U.S. Naval Academy graduates or instructors. The U.S. Naval Academy was founded in Annapolis on Oct. 10, 1845. This video highlights the Naval Academy and Its traditions. With over 80,000 graduates, the US Naval Academy has created a legacy for many to follow, including […]
ATI is proud that several of our instructors and friends are U.S. Naval Academy graduates or instructors.
The U.S. Naval Academy was founded in Annapolis on Oct. 10, 1845. This video highlights the Naval Academy and Its traditions.
With over 80,000 graduates, the US Naval Academy has created a legacy for many to follow, including a former President of the United States, Super Bowl MVP, Heisman Trophy winners, Olympic gold medalists, CEOs, astronauts, entrepreneurs, Rhodes scholars, Medal of Honor winners, noted scholars, and fellow alumni who have achieved greatness in every field they entered.
Elon Musk in SpaceX in Hawthorne, California, seems to become enamored by a new grandiose idea every week or so. And this week was no exception. This time he and his well-heeled colleagues are trying to find a way to serve the 3 billion earthlings hunkering down at scattered locations around the globe lacking service […]
Elon Musk in SpaceX in Hawthorne, California, seems to become enamored by a new grandiose idea every week or so. And this week was no exception. This time he and his well-heeled colleagues are trying to find a way to serve the 3 billion earthlings hunkering down at scattered locations around the globe lacking service by modern cellphones or conventional telephones.
The solution? Launch a giant swarm of broadband communication satellites into low-altitude circular orbits flying in a tight formation with one another as they circle around the globe. It is called OneWeb.
300-pound satellites are to be launched into 18 orbit planes with 40 satellites following one another in single file around each plane. Ku-band transmitters will provide satellite-based cellphone services to remote and underserved users everywhere in the world. Mass production techniques and the economies of scale should help keep the cost of each individual satellite in the $500,000 range. Recently the OneWeb satellites passed their preliminary design review at the famous satellite design center in Toulouse, France. OneWeb’s total network cost, including a widely dispersed network of gateway Earth stations, is expected to come in at about $3.5 billion, provided the cost-conscious satellite-makers in Exploration Park, Florida, can come in within their target budget. Company spokesmen ha ve indicated that, so far, their team members are on schedule and within 5% of their estimated costs.
About 15-percent of the $3.5 billion has been raised and has been funding about 300 full-time experts. Present schedules call for initial money-raising services to being in 2019. Some industry experts have been calling the concept the O3b “other three billion”, for the three billion widely distributed individuals unserved by mobile or hard-wired telephones.
Elon Musk is famous for turning wild ideas into practical reality and squeezed out impressive profits along the way. Many of his ideas have been floating around for some time when he decides to take a shot at turning them into reality. An earlier version of OneWeb was touted by Edward Tucks in the 1970’s. It was called Teledesic.
The Teledesic concept sprang to life because Tucks read that “40 million people (were) on the waiting list for telephone services around the world.” He quietly sketched up the plans for an 840-satellite constellation of communication satellites flitting through space in 435-mile orbits.
Launch costs were a big barrier then. But Elon Musk can now put a big dent in that problem with his surprisingly inexpensive Falcon boosters.
Tom Logsdon, the author of this blog teaches short courses for the Applied Technology Institute in Riva, Maryland. He will be discussing, in detail, the rapidly evolving OneWeb plans as they are springing from the drawing boards in the following short courses:
The author of this article, Tom Logsdon, teaches short courses, on a regular basis, for the Applied Technology Institute in Riva, Maryland. Here is his upcoming schedule of courses:
The USS Cole bombing was a terrorist attack against the United States Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole on 12 October 2000, while it was harbored and being refueled in the Yemeni port of Aden. Start date: October 12, 2000 Executed by: Al-Qaeda https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Cole_bombing October 11 – USS Mason launched two Standard Missile-2s (SM-2s) and a […]
The guided-missile destroyer USS Mason pulls into the port of Djibouti in July. (Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Timothy M. Ahearn/U.S. Navy)
The USS Cole bombing was a terrorist attack against the United States Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole on 12 October 2000, while it was harbored and being refueled in the Yemeni port of Aden.
Start date: October 12, 2000 Executed by: Al-Qaeda
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Cole_bombing
October 11 – USS Mason launched two Standard Missile-2s (SM-2s) and a single Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) on to intercept the two missiles that were launched about 7 P.M. local time. In addition to the missiles, the ship used its Nulka anti-ship missile decoy, the sources confirmed. Mason was operating in international waters north of the strait of Bab el-Mandeb at the time of the attack.
https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss-mason-fired-3-missiles-to-defend-from-yemen-cruise-missiles-attack
October 12, 2016 – U.S. Military Strikes Against Radar Sites in Yemen
The U.S. military struck three radar sites using cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled territory on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Initial assessments show the sites were destroyed. The strikes — authorized by President Obama at the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph Dunford — targeted radar sites involved in the recent missile launches threatening USS Mason and other vessels operating in international waters in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb.
http://usdefensewatch.com/2016/10/u-s-military-strikes-yemen-after-missile-attacks-on-u-s-navy-ship/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/12/more-missiles-fired-from-rebel-held-territory-in-yemen-at-u-s-navy-ships/
Many ATI instructors and course attendees have US government clearances. Clearly Storing Terabytes of TS Documents at Home Is Not A Good Idea!! “The digital media contained many terabytes of information that must be reviewed by appropriate authorities,” according to the motion. In it, a footnote describes a terabyte as equivalent to 500 hours of […]
Many ATI instructors and course attendees have US government clearances. Clearly Storing Terabytes of TS Documents at Home Is Not A Good Idea!!
“The digital media contained many terabytes of information that must be reviewed by appropriate authorities,” according to the motion. In it, a footnote describes a terabyte as equivalent to 500 hours of digital video, 200,000 image files or 1 million electronic books.
See the reference links below for more information.
http://www.databreachtoday.com/nsa-contractor-accused-taking-top-secret-documents-a-9438
ATI has Cyber Security courses. See the outlines at
https://aticourses.com/schedule.htm#communications
This is Hal Marin’s LinkedIn profile. I would not recommend asking to connect on LI with him unless you are an investigative journalist.
He only had 70 LI connections. I am glad that I am not one of them. He is a local UMBC PhD student since 2007-2017. Clearly completing a PhD dissertation was not a high priority for this character. The profile was still available on 10/06/2016.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/hal-martin-a2b51921
I have excerpted some in case it is taken down in the next few days.
Technical Advisor & Investigator on Offensive Cyber issues
Contractor and Consultant
July 2015 – Present (1 year 4 months)OSD – CYBER
Cyber (CNO) Engineering Advisor – Supporting OSD Leadership in pursuit of program oversight, management excellence, and optimal outcomes on issues for various Cyber related Initiatives across DoD and the IC. Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation.
Contractor and Consutant
Various
1996 – Present (20 years) Community
This account is for personal business and research; it does not represent any employer’s viewpoint, previous or current. I am presently with a very good firm of top-notch people.
ISSE
Various Consultants and Contractors
2001 – 2014 (13 years)Maryland and Northern Virginia
CNO – CND/CNE/CNA across the Community.
U.S. Naval Officer
U.S.Navy
Free Troubleshooting EMI workshop.
Identify, Characterize, and Prevent Electromagnetic Interference Problems
Hosted by Rohde & Schwarz
Join this highly focused free one-day seminar and learn how to uncover, characterize, and solve the most elusive EMI problems. Troubleshooting and localizing intermittent signals or multiple layers of broadband and narrowband signals can be frustrating even for the most seasoned EMC troubleshooter and RF engineer. We will discuss and demonstrate a number of test setups that can help the root causes of EMC test failures and then demonstrate how real-time analysis can literally make previously-hidden signals leap into plain view.
This seminar is intended for engineers and technicians involved in the development, troubleshooting, pre-compliance testing and certification of electronic products, systems and assemblies for EMC.
Elon Musk in SpaceX in Hawthorne, California, seems to become enamored by a new grandiose idea every week or so. And this week was no exception. This time he and his well-heeled colleagues are trying to find a way to serve the 3 billion earthlings hunkering down at scattered locations around the globe lacking service by modern cellphones or conventional telephones.
The solution? Launch a giant swarm of broadband communication satellites into low-altitude circular orbits flying in a tight formation with one another as they circle around the globe. It is called OneWeb.
300-pound satellites are to be launched into 18 orbit planes with 40 satellites following one another in single file around each plane. Ku-band transmitters will provide satellite-based cellphone services to remote and underserved users everywhere in the world. Mass production techniques and the economies of scale should help keep the cost of each individual satellite in the $500,000 range. Recently the OneWeb satellites passed their preliminary design review at the famous satellite design center in Toulouse, France. OneWeb’s total network cost, including a widely dispersed network of gateway Earth stations, is expected to come in at about $3.5 billion, provided the cost-conscious satellite-makers in Exploration Park, Florida, can come in within their target budget. Company spokesmen ha ve indicated that, so far, their team members are on schedule and within 5% of their estimated costs.
About 15-percent of the $3.5 billion has been raised and has been funding about 300 full-time experts. Present schedules call for initial money-raising services to being in 2019. Some industry experts have been calling the concept the O3b “other three billion”, for the three billion widely distributed individuals unserved by mobile or hard-wired telephones.
Elon Musk is famous for turning wild ideas into practical reality and squeezed out impressive profits along the way. Many of his ideas have been floating around for some time when he decides to take a shot at turning them into reality. An earlier version of OneWeb was touted by Edward Tucks in the 1970’s. It was called Teledesic.
The Teledesic concept sprang to life because Tucks read that “40 million people (were) on the waiting list for telephone services around the world.” He quietly sketched up the plans for an 840-satellite constellation of communication satellites flitting through space in 435-mile orbits.
Launch costs were a big barrier then. But Elon Musk can now put a big dent in that problem with his surprisingly inexpensive Falcon boosters.
Tom Logsdon, the author of this blog teaches short courses for the Applied Technology Institute in Riva, Maryland. He will be discussing, in detail, the rapidly evolving OneWeb plans as they are springing from the drawing boards in the following short courses:
The author of this article, Tom Logsdon, teaches short courses, on a regular basis, for the Applied Technology Institute in Riva, Maryland. Here is his upcoming schedule of courses:
